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PRISONER TRANSFER BETWEEN HONG 
KONG AND MAINLAND CHINA: A 
PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT 
Choy Dick Wan* 
INTRODUCTION 
ince the handover of Hong Kong to the People’s Republic of China 
(“PRC”), the number of cross-border crimes committed by resi-
dents of Hong Kong in mainland China (“the Mainland”) and vice versa 
has increased drastically. The increase in cross-border crimes and pun-
ishments has naturally led to a rise in the number of each jurisdiction’s 
residents serving sentences in the other jurisdiction. However, even 
though ten years have passed since the sovereignty of Hong Kong re-
verted to the PRC on July 1, 1997,1 no prisoner has been transferred to 
his home jurisdiction from either Hong Kong or the Mainland. 
Prisoner transfer, which allows foreign prisoners to be transferred back 
to their home countries to serve their remaining sentences, is internation-
ally regarded as necessary on both humanitarian and rehabilitative 
grounds.2 It also improves the administrative efficiency of prisons in ju-
risdictions that sentence foreigners by minimizing the costs and difficul-
ties associated with incarcerating foreigners (such as language barriers 
and different dietary habits). The principal cause of the failure to transfer 
prisoners to their home jurisdictions in Hong Kong or the Mainland is the 
lack of a prisoner transfer agreement (“PTA”) between the two jurisdic-
tions. 
Michal Plachta has remarked that a standing (bilateral or multilateral) 
PTA is essential to international prisoner transfer because it provides “an 
appropriate legal basis” for the relevant transfer and facilitates smoother 
and more expedient transfers.3 However, various fundamental principles 
commonly adopted in bilateral and multilateral PTAs have already 
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 1. Edward A. Gargan, Hong Kong, China: The Overview; China Resumes Control of 
Hong Kong, Concluding 156 Years of British Rule, July 1, 1997, N.Y. TIMES, at A1. 
 2. Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Convention on the Transfer of Sen-
tenced Persons para. 9, available at http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/en/Reports/Html/ 
112.htm [hereinafter Explanatory Report to the CTSP]. 
 3. MICHAL PLACHTA, TRANSFER OF PRISONERS UNDER INTERNATIONAL INSTRUMENTS 
AND DOMESTIC LEGISLATION: A COMPARATIVE STUDY 255 (1993). 
S 
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proved problematic in international practice. Given the fact that Hong 
Kong and the Mainland are two independent jurisdictional sovereignties 
under the One Country, Two Systems principle,4 it can be anticipated 
that the same problems that arise in international prisoner transfer are 
likely to arise in prisoner transfer between Hong Kong and the Mainland. 
Moreover, the political, legal, economic, social, and cultural differences 
between the two jurisdictions can be expected to cause additional trou-
bles and controversy. Therefore, reaching a PTA that will satisfy both 
Hong Kong and the Mainland is bound to be an extremely difficult and 
tedious process. 
Should the prisoners in both Hong Kong and the Mainland be deprived 
of the right to be transferred home to serve their remaining sentences 
simply because of the lack of a PTA between the two jurisdictions? How 
effective will any future Hong Kong-Mainland PTA be in facilitating 
prisoner transfer between the two jurisdictions? Are there any alterna-
tives to transfer on the basis of a standing PTA? This Article assesses the 
challenges to negotiating and implementing a PTA between Hong Kong 
and the Mainland and explores alternative mechanisms to facilitate pris-
oner transfer absent a standing PTA. 
Part I of this Article briefly explains the necessity of prisoner transfer 
between Hong Kong and the Mainland. Part II discusses the international 
norms regarding prisoner transfer and highlights the five fundamental 
principles that are commonly included in international PTAs, namely the 
requirements of nationality/residence, double criminality, finality of 
judgment, minimum remaining sentence, and tripartite consent. Addi-
tionally, the bilateral PTAs China and Hong Kong, respectively, have 
signed with other jurisdictions will be introduced. These PTAs and the 
two jurisdictions’ experiences in concluding them are useful references 
in assessing the problems likely to arise in the negotiation of a PTA be-
tween Hong Kong and the Mainland. Focusing on the five fundamental 
principles governing international prisoner transfer, Part III analyzes the 
possible problems Hong Kong and the Mainland would face if those 
principles were adopted in any future PTA between the two jurisdictions. 
Part IV examines the possibility of ad hoc prisoner transfer and repatria-
tion/deportation as alternative means to facilitate the transfer of prisoners 
between Hong Kong and the Mainland, and argues that these methods 
                                                                                                             
 4. For detailed arguments on the jurisdictional issues between Hong Kong and the 
Mainland, see, for example, H.L. Fu, The Relevance of Chinese Criminal Law to Hong 
Kong and Its Residents, 27 H.K. L.J. 229 (1997); Hualing Fu, One Country and Two 
Systems: Will Hong Kong and the Mainland Reach an Agreement on Rendition?, H.K. 
LAWYER, Jan. 1999. 
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may be more practical, especially while a formal PTA between Hong 
Kong and the Mainland has yet to be concluded. 
I. THE NEED FOR A PRISONER TRANSFER MECHANISM BETWEEN HONG 
KONG AND THE MAINLAND 
As a direct consequence of the increase in cross-border crime between 
the Mainland and Hong Kong, the Mainland-resident inmate population 
in Hong Kong has soared.5 In 1999, for example, 3024 out of 11,571 
prisoners in Hong Kong came from the Mainland.6 In 2003, among the 
13,086 prisoners in Hong Kong, 3759 of them came from the Mainland.7 
Thus, the number of Mainland prisoners increased by 24% during the 
period from 1999 to 2003.8 As of November 2005, there were 3502 
Mainlanders serving sentences in Hong Kong, representing 28.8% of the 
prison population.9 Despite a gradual improvement in this situation in the 
last several years, Mainlanders still constituted 23% of Hong Kong’s 
prison population as of mid-January 2008.10 The large Mainland prison 
population in Hong Kong is particularly striking with respect to female 
prisoners. Mainland women constituted about 70% of the total female 
penal population in Hong Kong in 2006.11 A majority of the female 
Mainland prisoners in Hong Kong were imprisoned for breach of condi-
tions of stay and prostitution.12 
The large number of Mainland prisoners has aggravated the already 
overcrowded prison conditions in Hong Kong, increasing the workload 
of the penal staff and causing hardship for the inmates.13 Given that 
                                                                                                             
 5. See Dennis Chong, Mainlanders Pour into Jail, THE STANDARD (H.K.), Nov. 18, 
2003. 
 6. Id. 
 7. Id. 
 8. Id. 
 9. LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, PANEL ON SECURITY, LC PAPER NO. 
CB(2)755/05-06, at 5 (2005), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr05-06/english/ 
panels/se/minutes/se051101.pdf [hereinafter LC PAPER NO. CB(2)755/05-06]. 
 10. Jianyu jipo; Jian-guan-bu jihua chongjian Chi Ma Wan cheng-jiao-shu [Prisons 
Are Overcrowded; Correction Services Department Plans to Rebuild Chi Ma Wan 
Prison], WENHUI BAO [WEN HUI DAILY], Jan. 18, 2008. 
 11. Wendy Leung, Safety Fears for Inmates at Overcrowded Female Jails, THE 
STANDARD (H.K.), Jan. 18, 2006. 
 12. Id.; Kristine Kwok, Jail Revamp to Create 2,600 Places in Ten Years, SOUTH 
CHINA MORNING POST, Feb. 3, 2005. 
 13. See Kwok, supra note 12. According to the Commissioner of Correctional Ser-
vices in Hong Kong, as of February 2005, prisons in Hong Kong were fourteen percent 
over capacity. Id. 
466 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:2 
Hong Kong has been a role model for the Mainland in many respects,14 
the Correctional Services Department of Hong Kong has been further 
stressed by the pressure to maintain the high standards of Hong Kong’s 
penal system. Poor prison conditions and substandard treatment of the 
inmates threatens to tarnish the image of the Hong Kong system in the 
eyes of both the inmates and the Mainland authorities. Worse, it may 
eventually undermine Hong Kong’s image in the international commu-
nity. 
Hong Kong is part of the PRC; as with most of Hong Kong’s residents, 
a majority of the Mainlanders who serve sentences in Hong Kong are 
ethnically Chinese.15 But there are in fact a wide range of differences 
between Hong Kong residents and Mainland residents. These include 
different spoken dialects, written characters, living styles, and dietary 
habits.16 These differences are most palpable with respect to Mainlanders 
from the northern part of China. As a result of these differences, a 
Mainland prisoner in Hong Kong may have an experience not unlike a 
                                                                                                             
 14. For example, China drew on Hong Kong’s Independent Commission Against 
Corruption as a model when considering the establishment and mode of operation of its 
National Bureau of Corruption Prevention (which was established on May 31, 2007). 
Xianggang dute tiwei nanyi tidai [Hong Kong’s Unique Status Is Difficult to Replace], 
DAGONG BAO [DA KUNG PAO NEWS], June 29, 2007. In order to further promote 
Mainland adoption of Hong Kong-style governance, Gao Siren, Director of the Liaison 
Office of the Central People’s Government in the Hong Kong Special Administrative 
Region (“HKSAR”), has pointed out that the Mainland could learn about economic inno-
vation from Hong Kong. Id. In addition, Chen Cunyi, Deputy Chief of the Ministry of 
Public Security’s Drug Control Bureau, has opined that Hong Kong’s anti-drug measures, 
including drug use prevention and rehabilitation, and methods of combating drug-related 
crimes could serve as models for counterpart measures in the Mainland. Yang Zhe, Gon-
gan-bu gaoguan tan Xianggang jin du [High Official of Ministry of Public Security 
Talked About Hong Kong’s Drug Controls], ZIJING ZAZHI WANGLUO BAN [BAUHINIA 
MAGAZINE ONLINE], Mar. 2007, available at http://www.baumag.com.hk/BIG5/channel3 
/03/0334.html. 
 15. As of January 2002, ninety percent of the inmates in Hong Kong prisons were 
ethnically Chinese; 27.5% of the inmates were Mainland Chinese. See SECURITY BUREAU 
OF THE HKSAR, PRISON DEVELOPMENT PLAN, LC PAPER NO. CB(2)1023/01-02(03), an-
nex A, app. C (2002), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr01-02/english/panels/se/ 
papers/se0207cb2-1023-3e.pdf [hereinafter LC PAPER NO. CB(2)1023/01-02(03)]. 
 16. Faguan zhi yuyan yinshi butong zeng zuo jian zhi ku; she fei lie waiji fan huo jian 
xing [Judge Pointed Out That Differences in Language and Dietary Habit Increases the 
Hardship of Imprisonment; Criminals Who Illegally Entered Hong Kong Being Classified 
as Foreign Prisoners and Granted Sentencing Reductions], XIN BAO [H.K. DAILY NEWS], 
Sept. 15, 2001, at A5 [hereinafter Differences in Language and Dietary Habit]. For ex-
ample, a majority of people in the Mainland speak Mandarin and write with simplified 
Chinese characters, while a majority of the Chinese people in Hong Kong speak Canton-
ese and write with traditional Chinese characters. 
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non-Chinese foreign prisoner. Moreover, the strict outbound travel policy 
for residents of the Mainland (though this has been substantially relaxed 
in recent years)17 makes it difficult for Mainland prisoners to receive vis-
its from their families. Overall, Mainland prisoners and foreign prisoners 
face similar hardships, and both are non-locals in Hong Kong. 
This similarity was captured in an opinion by a district court judge in 
Hong Kong.18 In deciding a case involving a burglary by two Mainland 
illegal immigrants, the judge pointed out that both Mainlanders and ex-
patriates are “outsiders” within Hong Kong and Mainlanders should thus 
be considered “foreigners.”19 Mainland prisoners, the judge noted, suffer 
the same (or greater) hardships as expatriate prisoners.20 Taking this into 
consideration, the judge reduced the sentences of the prisoners by two 
months.21 This judgment was subsequently reversed by the Court of Ap-
peal of the High Court on two grounds: 1) “foreignness” does not entitle 
non-local prisoners, including foreign nationals and Chinese nationals, to 
a reduction of sentence as a matter of right; and 2) Chinese nationals 
from the Mainland are not “foreigners” because Hong Kong is a part of 
China.22 The Court of Appeal’s consideration of the “foreignness” of 
both foreigners and Mainlanders as non-locals implied that both foreign 
nationals and Mainlanders in Hong Kong prisons should receive equal 
treatment. Furthermore, although the court emphasized that Mainlanders 
should not be regarded as foreigners, it still considered the hardships that 
                                                                                                             
 17. One measure that relaxed the stringent outbound travel policy in the Mainland 
was the Individual Visit Scheme. See Government of the Hong Kong Special Administra-
tive Region [HKSAR], Tourism Commission, Visitor Information: Individual Visit 
Scheme, http://www.tourism.gov.hk/english/visitors/visitors_ind.html (last visited Feb. 
19, 2008). In the past, it was very difficult for Mainlanders to travel to Hong Kong, even 
as tourists. Since the introduction of the Individual Visit Scheme on July 28, 2003, it has 
become easier for Mainlanders to visit Hong Kong. As of February 2008, the scheme had 
been extended to forty-nine cities in mainland China. Id. 
 18. Differences in Language and Dietary Habit, supra note 16. 
 19. Id. 
 20. Id. The judge noted that, as with expatriate prisoners, Mainland prisoners encoun-
ter hardships stemming from dietary differences and problems receiving visits from their 
families. Id. Mainland prisoners are also discriminated against by the local prisoners in 
the same way that many Mainland residents generally feel discriminated against in Hong 
Kong. Id. 
 21. Id.; Guan zhi bi waiji jiufan geng ku; liang she ke bu guan gang jian yu huo jian 
xing [Judge Pointed Out That They Suffer More Hardship Than Foreign Prisoners; Two 
Illegal Immigrants Unaccustomed to Hong Kong Prison Being Granted Sentencing Re-
ductions], SINGTAO RIBAO [SINGTAO DAILY], Sept. 15, 2001, at A13. 
 22. See Secretary of Justice v. Ng Kit, [2001] CAAR 14/2001, http://legalref. 
judiciary.gov.hk/lrs/common/ju/judgment.jsp (C.A.). 
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the two prisoners might face as Mainlanders.23 Because foreign prisoners 
in Hong Kong have the right to request a transfer to their home countries 
to serve their sentences (based on standing PTAs between Hong Kong 
and their home countries or in the form of ad hoc transfer),24 there is no 
reason, practical or theoretical, why Mainland prisoners should be de-
prived of such right. 
II. INTERNATIONAL NORMS AND DOMESTIC LAW 
A. Major Conditions for Prisoner Transfer Under International Law 
The Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (“CTSP”), 
drafted by the Council of Europe in 1983,25 is the foremost multilateral 
treaty governing the transfer of prisoners.26 As the Explanatory Report to 
the CTSP states, “[t]he purpose of the Convention is to facilitate the 
transfer of foreign prisoners to their home countries by providing a pro-
cedure which is simple as well as expeditious.”27 Unlike other European 
conventions, the CTSP is open to both member states and non-member 
states of the Council of Europe.28  As of February 2008, forty-seven 
member states and seventeen non-member states had signed and/or rati-
fied the CTSP.29 
In 1985, almost two years after the entry into force of the CTSP, the 
United Nations adopted the Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign 
Prisoners (“Model Agreement”).30 The Model Agreement is largely a 
                                                                                                             
 23. Id. 
 24. SECURITY BUREAU OF THE HKSAR, PROVISIONAL LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL PANEL ON 
SECURITY, TRANSFER OF PRISONERS (1997), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr97-
98/english/panels/se/papers/se2011-5.htm [hereinafter SECURITY BUREAU, TRANSFER OF 
PRISONERS]. 
 25. Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, Mar. 21, 
1983, 1496 U.N.T.S. 92, 22 I.L.M. 530 [hereinafter CTSP]. 
 26. Torben Akel, Barred from Jail Time at Home, N.Z. HERALD, Dec. 8, 2007, avail-
able at http://www.nzherald.co.nz/section/1/story.cfm?c_id=1&objectid=10481059&p 
num=0. 
 27. Explanatory Report to the CTSP, supra note 2, para. 8. 
 28. CTSP, supra note 25, art. 19. 
 29. Council of Europe, Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons: Status, 
http://conventions.coe.int/Treaty/Commun/ChercheSig.asp?NT=112&CM=8&DF=&CL
=ENG (last visited Feb. 19, 2008) [hereinafter CTSP Status]. 
 30. United Nations [U.N.] Dep’t of Int’l and Soc. Affairs, Seventh U.N. Congress on 
the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Report Prepared by the Secre-
tariat, annex 1, Model Agreement on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners, U.N. Doc. 
A/CONF.121/22/Rev.1 (1986) [hereinafter Model Agreement]. See also Seventh U.N. 
Congress on the Prevention of Crime and the Treatment of Offenders, Formulation and 
Application of United Nations Standards and Norms in Criminal Justice: Model Agree-
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simplified version of the CTSP. Both documents set out five major con-
ditions for prisoner transfer. 
 
1. Nationality/Residency Status. Under the CTSP and the Model 
Agreement, to be eligible for a transfer, a prisoner must be a national or 
resident of the state to which he requests a transfer.31 
 
2. Double Criminality. According to international practice, a prisoner 
transfer can be carried out only if the double criminality requirement is 
fulfilled, i.e., the act that forms the basis of the foreign prisoner’s convic-
tion is a crime under the laws of both the sentencing state and the receiv-
ing state.32 The double criminality principle saves the receiving state 
from imprisoning a person in its territory for an offense that is not a 
crime under its law and from any possible legal or constitutional conflict 
arising from the enforcement of a foreign sentence that has no basis in its 
domestic laws.33 
 
3. Finality of Judgment. Under both the CTSP and the Model Agree-
ment, a transfer can only be conducted if the relevant judgment is final; 
that is, the prisoner must have exhausted all available remedies in the 
sentencing state or the time limit for seeking those remedies has ex-
pired.34 
 
4. Minimum Remaining Sentence. Both the CTSP and the Model 
Agreement set the minimum duration of sentence remaining to be served 
by the prisoner at the time he applies for a transfer at six months.35 This 
                                                                                                             
ment on the Transfer of Foreign Prisoners and Recommendations for the Treatment of 
Foreign Prisoners, pt. 1, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.121/10 (Apr. 25, 1985) [hereinafter Ex-
planatory Notes on the Model Agreement]. 
 31. CTSP, supra note 25, art. 3(1)(a); Model Agreement, supra note 30, para. 1. 
 32. The double criminality principle does not require the act committed by the pris-
oner to be classified as exactly the same offense under the laws of the sentencing state 
and the receiving state. The Explanatory Report to the CTSP comments: 
For the condition of dual criminal liability to be fulfilled it is not necessary that 
the criminal offence be precisely the same under both the law of the administer-
ing State and the law of the sentencing State. There may be differences in the 
wording and legal classification. The basic idea is that the essential constituent 
elements of the offence should be comparable under the law of both States. 
Explanatory Report to the CTSP, supra note 2, para. 24. 
 33. See PLACHTA, supra note 3, at 306–07. 
 34. See CTSP, supra note 25, art. 3(1)(b); Model Agreement, supra note 30, para. 10. 
 35. CTSP, supra note 25, art. 3(1)(c); Model Agreement, supra note 30, para. 11. 
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requirement is a practical necessity on three grounds. First, prisoner 
transfer is a complicated and time-consuming process because of differ-
ences in political and legal systems, diplomatic considerations, and very 
often language differences between the two countries or jurisdictions 
involved in the transfer.36 The government authorities of the sentencing 
state and the receiving state need sufficient time to process a transfer ap-
plication. Second, the rehabilitation objective of prisoner transfer “can 
usefully be pursued only where the length of the sentence still to be 
served is sufficiently long.”37 Third, given the financial implications of a 
prisoner transfer for both the sentencing state and the receiving state (and 
the latter in particular), at least according to the Explanatory Report to 
the CTSP, a prisoner transfer is worth implementing only if the expense 
incurred is “proportionate to the purpose to be achieved” on the ground 
of cost-effectiveness.38 
 
5. Tripartite Consent. This condition embodies the humanitarian prin-
ciple underlying prisoner transfers in that, in general, a transfer can only 
be conducted with the consent of the sentencing state, the receiving state, 
and the prisoner concerned.39 A transfer without the consent of the pris-
oner may only be carried out in very limited circumstances. For example, 
if, due to the age, physical condition, or mental health of the prisoner, 
either the sentencing state or the receiving state considers the prisoner 
unfit to consent, a legal representative may give consent on his behalf.40 
With the adoption of the Additional Protocol to the CTSP (“Additional 
Protocol”) by the Committee of Ministers of the Council of Europe on 
December 18, 1997,41 transfer in the absence of a prisoner’s consent may 
                                                                                                             
 36. See Explanatory Notes on the Model Agreement, supra note 30, para. 22. 
 37. Explanatory Report to the CTSP, supra note 2, para. 22. However, in practice 
many prisoners are given parole after being transferred back to the receiving state. For 
example, almost one-third of the first group of Americans to be transferred from Mexico 
to the United States in December 1977 under the Mexican-American PTA were eligible 
for parole as soon as they returned to the United States. Abraham Abramovsky & Steven 
J. Eagle, A Critical Evaluation of the Mexican-American Transfer of Penal Sanctions 
Treaty, 64 IOWA L. REV. 275, 275 (1979). 
 38. Explanatory Report to the CTSP, supra note 2, para. 22. 
 39. CTSP, supra note 25, art. 3(1)(d), (f); Model Agreement, supra note 30, para. 5. 
 40. See CTSP, supra note 25, art. 3(1)(d); Explanatory Report to the CTSP, supra 
note 2, para. 23; Model Agreement, supra note 30, para. 9; Explanatory Notes on the 
Model Agreement, supra note 30, para. 19. 
 41. Council of Europe Additional Protocol to the Convention on the Transfer of Sen-
tenced Persons, Dec. 18, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 560 [hereinafter Additional Protocol to the 
CTSP]. See also Council of Europe, Explanatory Report to the Additional Protocol to the 
Convention on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, available at http://conventions.coe. 
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be conducted in two more circumstances: 1) when a prisoner has fled the 
sentencing state for his home country before fully serving the prison term 
in the sentencing state42 and 2) when the conviction results in an expul-
sion or deportation order that precludes the prisoner from remaining in 
the territory of the sentencing state following release from prison.43 Not-
withstanding that each of the three parties has an interest in a prisoner 
transfer, the ultimate aim of a prisoner transfer is to benefit the prisoner, 
and a prisoner’s consent should have greater weight than that of the other 
two parties. Unfortunately, as will be demonstrated in subsequent sec-
tions of this Article, the issue of prisoner consent can easily be disre-
garded by the sentencing state, the receiving state, or both.44 
B. Bilateral PTAs 
1. China’s Bilateral PTAs with Other Countries 
Concluding a PTA is a relatively new experience for the PRC. Accord-
ing to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the first PTA the PRC entered into 
was with Ukraine in July 2001.45 As of July 2006, the PRC had signed 
only three bilateral PTAs. In addition to the one with Ukraine, two others 
were signed with Russia and Spain in December 2002 and November 
2005, respectively.46 
While the PRC has not signed the CTSP, the contents of the bilateral 
PTAs it has signed are largely consistent with the CTSP and the Model 
                                                                                                             
int/Treaty/EN/Reports/HTML/167.htm [hereinafter Explanatory Report to the Additional 
Protocol to the CTSP]. 
 42. Additional Protocol to the CTSP, supra note 41, art. 2. See also Explanatory Re-
port to the Additional Protocol to the CTSP, supra note 41, paras. 10–20. 
 43. Additional Protocol to the CTSP, supra note 41, art. 3. See also Explanatory Re-
port to the Additional Protocol to the CTSP, supra note 41, paras. 21–36. 
 44. See infra Parts II.B.1, IV.A. 
 45. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo he Wukelan guanyu yi guan bei pan xing ren  
de tiaoyue [Treaty on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, P.R.C-Ukr.], July 21, 2001,  
3 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 205 (2002), available  
at http://210.82.31.30/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=295150&pdmc=rdgb 
[hereinafter P.R.C.-Ukr. PTA]. 
 46. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo he Eluosi guanyu yi guan bei pan xing ren  
de tiaoyue [Treaty on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, P.R.C.-Russ.], Dec. 2, 2002, 1 
STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 48 (2004), available at http://210.82.31. 
30/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=327812&pdmc=rdgb [hereinafter P.R.C.-
Russ. PTA]; Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo he Xibanya guanyu yi guan bei pan xing  
ren de tiaoyue [Treaty on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, P.R.C.-Spain], Apr. 18, 
2005, 5 STANDING COMM. NAT’L PEOPLE’S CONG. GAZ. 48 (2006), available  
at http://210.82.31.30/zgrdw/common/zw.jsp?label=WXZLK&id=350141&pdmc=rdgb 
[hereinafter P.R.C.-Spain PTA]. 
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Agreement, with three exceptions. First, instead of six months, the mini-
mum duration of remaining sentence in all three of the PRC’s bilateral 
PTAs is one year.47 Second, express provisions in the PTAs with Ukraine 
and Russia prohibit the transfer of prisoners in the following circum-
stances: 1) when one party to the agreement considers that the transfer 
will harm its sovereignty, security, and public order, or violate funda-
mental principles of its domestic law;48 2) the sentenced person has not 
cleared his debt in the sentencing state or he is a party to lawsuits pend-
ing in the sentencing state;49 3) the sentenced person was convicted for 
the crime of endangering national security;50 and 4) the sentenced person 
received a death sentence or life imprisonment.51 Third, the PTAs with 
Ukraine and Russia grant the signatories considerable discretion, provid-
ing that each state has “the autonomy to decide on its own whether to 
consent to a transfer requested by the other party.”52 
2. Hong Kong’s Bilateral PTAs with Other Countries 
The United Kingdom ratified the CTSP on April 30, 1985.53 The CTSP 
was given legal effect in the United Kingdom by virtue of the Repatria-
tion of Prisoners Act 1984 (“RPA”), which was passed after the United 
Kingdom signed the CTSP.54 As with other international agreements that 
the United Kingdom had signed, the CTSP (or to be more precise, the 
RPA) was extended to some of the colonies of the United Kingdom in 
the form of two Orders-in-Council, namely the Repatriation of Prisoners 
(Overseas Territories) Order 1986 and the Repatriation of Prisoners 
(Overseas Territories) (Amendment) Order 1987.55 These two Orders-in-
                                                                                                             
 47. P.R.C.-Ukr. PTA, supra note 45, art. 4.3; P.R.C.-Russ. PTA, supra note 46, art. 
5.3; P.R.C.-Spain PTA, supra note 46, art. 2.1.1. 
 48. P.R.C.-Ukr. PTA, supra note 45, art. 5.1.1; P.R.C.-Russ. PTA, supra note 46, art. 
6.1.1. 
 49. P.R.C.-Ukr. PTA, supra note 45, art. 5.1.2; P.R.C.-Russ. PTA, supra note 46, art. 
6.1.3. 
 50. P.R.C.-Russ. PTA, supra note 46, art. 6.1.2. This clause only appears in the PTA 
between the PRC and Russia. 
 51. P.R.C.-Russ. PTA, supra note 46, art. 6.1.4. Transfer of prisoners sentenced to 
life imprisonment is possible under the PTAs the PRC has signed with Ukraine and 
Spain. See P.R.C.-Ukr. PTA, supra note 45, art. 1.4; P.R.C.-Spain PTA, supra note 46, 
art. 7.3. 
 52. P.R.C.-Ukr. PTA, supra note 45, art. 5.2; P.R.C.-Russ. PTA, supra note 46, art. 
6.2. 
 53. CTSP Status, supra note 29. 
 54. See HONG KONG HANSARD, Sept. 3, 1997, available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/ 
yr97-98/english/counmtg/hansard/970903fe.htm. 
 55. Re Yung Kwan Lee & Others, [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. 245, 245 (C.F.A.); HONG 
KONG HANSARD, Sept. 3, 1997, supra note 54; Janice Brabyn, Inter-Jurisdictional Co-
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Council were the basis for prisoner transfer between Hong Kong and 
twenty-five countries (including the United Kingdom) until its reunifica-
tion with the PRC on July 1, 1997.56 
After the sovereignty of Hong Kong reverted to the PRC, the two Or-
ders-in-Council were no longer binding legal authority in Hong Kong. 
However, before the handover, the then Colonial Government had begun 
to negotiate PTAs with other countries in its own capacity in order to 
prevent a legal vacuum.57 At the same time, the Colonial Government 
also prepared local legislation to give effect to the PTAs it concluded.58 
On April 9, 1997, the Bill on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons Ordi-
nance (“TSPO”) was tabled in the Legislative Council (“LegCo”).59 As 
the Secretary for Security explained, the aim of the bill was “to enable 
Hong Kong to implement our new [transfer of sentenced persons] 
agreements with other jurisdictions.”60 On May 21, 1997, the bill finally 
passed, with only minor technical amendments.61 The TSPO entered into 
force on June 6, 1997 and survived the handover.62 The TSPO is merely 
a local recreation of the RPA, and four of the major conditions for trans-
fer under the CTSP, namely the nationality/residency requirement, dou-
ble criminality, finality of judgment, and tripartite consent, were included 
in it.63 
The TSPO is simply the enabling legislation that gives effect to the bi-
lateral PTAs signed by Hong Kong and other countries. It can only oper-
ate pursuant to the bilateral arrangements. The TSPO is silent on the na-
ture of the bilateral arrangements to which it gives effect. However, the 
Secretary for Security has emphasized that they can be in the form of 
                                                                                                             
Operation in Criminal Matters: Extradition, Mutual Legal Assistance, Prisoner Transfer 
to and from the HKSAR, in THE NEW LEGAL ORDER IN HONG KONG 139 (Raymond 
Wacks ed., 1999). 
 56. Re Yung Kwan Lee & Others, [1999] 2 H.K.C.F.A.R. at 245; HONG KONG 
HANSARD, Sept. 3, 1997, supra note 54; HONG KONG HANSARD, Apr. 9, 1997, at 59–60, 
available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr96-97/english/lc_sitg/hansard/970409fa.doc; 
Brabyn, supra note 55, at 139–40. 
 57. Hong Kong signed a PTA with the United States on April 15, 1997. SECURITY 
BUREAU, TRANSFER OF PRISONERS, supra note 24. 
 58. See HONG KONG HANSARD, Apr. 9, 1997, supra note 56, at 59–60. 
 59. Id. at 59. 
 60. Id. at 60. 
 61. HONG KONG HANSARD, May 21, 1997, at 159, 162, available at http://www. 
legco.gov.hk/yr96-97/english/lc_sitg/hansard/970521fe.doc. 
 62. SECURITY BUREAU, TRANSFER OF PRISONERS, supra note 24. 
 63. Transfer of Sentenced Persons Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 513, § 4, translated in 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/home.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2008) (H.K.). 
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standing agreements or arrangements on an ad hoc basis.64 As of April 
2006, Hong Kong had signed bilateral agreements with nine jurisdic-
tions, namely Australia, Italy, the Philippines, Portugal, Sri Lanka, Thai-
land, the United Kingdom, the United States, and Macau.65 As with the 
TSPO, all of these PTAs were largely based on the CTSP and the Model 
Agreement. 
The PTA with Macau is significant because it is the first regional PTA 
Hong Kong has signed with another part of the PRC. The Hong Kong-
Macau PTA was signed on May 20, 200566 pursuant to article 95 of the 
Basic Law of the Hong Kong Special Administrative Region 
(“HKSAR”) and article 93 of the Basic Law of the Macau Special Ad-
ministrative Region (“Macau SAR”).67 Because section 2(a)(ii) of the 
TSPO expressly limited the prisoner transfers it would govern to those 
between Hong Kong and “place[s] outside the People’s Republic of 
China,”68 LegCo passed the Transfer of Sentenced Persons (Amendment) 
(Macau) on June 29, 2005, which expanded the scope of application of 
the TSPO to Macau69 and allowed the TSPO to serve as a basis for im-
plementing a PTA between Hong Kong and Macau.70 
                                                                                                             
 64. Press Release, Hong Kong Government Information Centre, LCQ8: Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons (Mar. 13, 2002), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/ 
200203/13/0313286.htm [hereinafter LCQ8: Transfer of Sentenced Persons]. 
 65. See Department of Justice of the HKSAR, Treaties and International Agreements, 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/table5ti.htm (follow hyperlinks for each of the agree-
ments); Arrangement on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, H.K.-Mac., May 25, 2005, 
translated in http://www.legislation.gov.hk/intracountry/eng/pdf/macao/tsp.pdf [hereinaf-
ter Hong Kong-Macau PTA]. 
 66. See Hong Kong-Macau PTA, supra note 65. 
 67. Article 95 of the Basic Law of the HKSAR provides that “[t]he Hong Kong Spe-
cial Administrative Region may, through consultations and in accordance with law, main-
tain juridical relations with the judicial organs of other parts of the country, and they may 
render assistance to each other.” XIANGGANG JI BEN FA [BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG 
SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE REGION] art. 95, translated in http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_ 
law/fulltext/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2008). Article 93 of the Basic Law of the 
Macau Special Administrative Region (“Macau SAR”) provides that “[t]he Macao Spe-
cial Administrative Region may, through consultations and in accordance with law, main-
tain judicial relations with the judicial organs of other parts of the country, and they may 
render assistance to each other.” Basic Law of the Macau Special Administrative Region 
art. 93, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Apr. 16, 2008). 
 68. Transfer of Sentenced Persons Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 513, § 2(a)(ii). 
 69. HONG KONG HANSARD, June 29, 2005, at 9128–39, available at http://www. 
legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/counmtg/hansard/cm0629ti-translate-e.pdf. 
 70. Id. at 9128–39. Because this amendment was limited by its terms to transfers 
between Macau and Hong Kong, it does not encompass transfers between Hong Kong 
and any other areas of the PRC. To effectuate a PTA between Hong Kong and the rest of 
the PRC, the Legislative Council would be required to amend the TSPO accordingly. 
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III. CHALLENGES FOR A FUTURE HONG KONG-MAINLAND PTA 
Negotiation of a PTA between Hong Kong and the Mainland com-
menced in March 2000.71 Although the details of the discussions have 
not been announced, it is generally believed that a future Hong Kong-
Mainland PTA will be consistent with international practice and will in-
clude more or less the same provisions as the international PTAs.72 The 
substance of the negotiations has been concerned mainly with the major 
principles and provisions underlying the TSPO and the bilateral PTAs 
Hong Kong has signed with other countries.73 Under the principle of One 
Country, Two Systems, Hong Kong’s jurisdiction is not subordinate to 
the PRC or to any other state,74 and consequently it has been perfectly 
appropriate for negotiators to examine these preexisting agreements with 
a view to adopting international prisoner transfer principles and practice 
in any future Hong Kong-Mainland PTA. 
However, even if international principles and practices are followed, 
one can anticipate many problems that would arise regarding prisoner 
transfer between Hong Kong and the Mainland, given the great legal, 
political, economic, and social differences between the two jurisdictions. 
Focusing on the aforementioned five major conditions for prisoner trans-
fer, the following sections examine issues arising from their inclusion in 
a Hong Kong-Mainland PTA and some practical problems in their im-
plementation. 
A. Nationality/Residency Status 
Consistent with international practice, the nationality requirement was 
adopted in all PTAs Hong Kong has signed, excluding the one with 
Macau.75 Because Hong Kong and Macau are special administrative re-
                                                                                                             
 71. Press Release, Hong Kong Government Information Centre, LCQ20: Work on 
Transfer of Sentenced Persons Arrangements with the Mainland in Progress (Nov. 16, 
2005), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200511/16/P200511160203.htm. 
 72. See id. 
 73. Press Release, Hong Kong Government Information Centre, LCQ6: Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons (June 30, 2004), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/ 
200406/30/0630280.htm [hereinafter LCQ6: Transfer of Sentenced Persons]; Press Re-
lease, Hong Kong Government Information Centre, LCQ7: Discussions with Mainland 
Authorities on Transfer of Sentenced Persons Continue (Dec. 1, 2004), available at 
http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200412/01/1201166.htm. 
 74. See supra note 4 and accompanying text. 
 75. See, e.g., Agreement on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, H.K.-Fr., art. 3(a), 
May 1, 2008, translated in http://www.legislation.gov.hk/table5ti.htm (follow “Eng-
lish(pdf)” hyperlink in “France” row) [hereinafter Hong Kong-France PTA]. For addi-
tional examples, see Department of Justice of the HKSAR, Treaties and International 
Agreements, supra note 65. See also Hong Kong-Macau PTA, supra note 65. 
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gions within the PRC and most people in these two jurisdictions are na-
tionals of the PRC, the determining factor for transfer eligibility is 
whether the prisoner concerned is a “permanent resident” of the receiv-
ing jurisdiction.76 The term permanent resident is defined in the relevant 
parts of the Basic Law of the HKSAR and the Basic Law of the Macau 
SAR.77 
In addition to the nationality requirement, under some bilateral PTAs 
between Hong Kong and other countries, a prisoner who can prove that 
he has “close ties” with the receiving state may also be eligible for trans-
fer.78 The close ties requirement is also included in the PTA between 
Hong Kong and Macau.79 However, unlike the permanent resident re-
quirement, the term “close ties” has not been defined in the relevant 
agreements or any law of Hong Kong.80 The Hong Kong Security Bureau 
(“Security Bureau”) has said that the term will be given its ordinary 
meaning, and in determining whether a prisoner has close ties with the 
receiving state, the individual circumstances of each case will be taken 
into account. 81  Additionally, the Security Bureau has announced that 
guidelines for what constitutes close ties will be synthesized after the 
accumulation of a significant number of precedents.82 However, the close 
                                                                                                             
 76. See Hong Kong-Macau PTA, supra note 65, art. 4(2). 
 77. XIANGGANG JI BEN FA [BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
REGION] art. 24, translated in http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/index.htm (last 
visited Apr. 21, 2008); Basic Law of the Macau Special Administrative Region art. 24, 
translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Apr. 16, 2008). 
 78. For example, the “close ties” requirement is included in the PTAs Hong Kong 
signed with Australia, the Philippines, Portugal, and the United Kingdom. See Agreement 
on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, H.K.-Austl., art. 4(b)–(c), Nov. 25, 2005, trans-
lated in http://www.legislation.gov.hk/table5ti.htm (follow “English(pdf)” hyperlink in 
“Australia” row) [hereinafter Hong Kong-Australia PTA]; Agreement on the Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons, H.K.-Phil., art. 4(b), Apr. 28, 2002, translated in 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/table5ti.htm (follow “English(pdf)” hyperlink in “Philip-
pines” row) [hereinafter Hong Kong-Philippines PTA]; Agreement on the Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons, H.K.-Port., art. 4(b)–(c), May 24, 2001, translated in 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/table5ti.htm (follow “English(pdf)” hyperlink in “Portu-
gal” row); Agreement on the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, H.K.-U.K., art. 4(b)–(c), 
Nov. 5, 1997, translated in http://www.legislation.gov.hk/table5ti.htm (follow “Eng-
lish(pdf)” hyperlink in “United Kingdom” row) [hereinafter Hong Kong-United Kingdom 
PTA]. 
 79. Hong Kong-Macau PTA, supra note 65, art. 4(2). 
 80. HKSAR LEGISLATIVE COUNCIL SECRETARIAT, REP. OF THE BILLS COMM. ON 
TRANSFER OF SENTENCED PERSONS (AMENDMENT) (MACAU) BILL, LC PAPER NO. 
CB(2)2018/04-05, at 4–5 (2005), available at http://www.legco.gov.hk/yr04-05/english/ 
bc/bc53/reports/bc53cb2-rpt-e.pdf [hereinafter LC PAPER NO. CB(2)2018/04-05]. 
 81. Id. at 4. 
 82. Id. at 5. 
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relationship between Hong Kong and Macau may complicate the appli-
cation of the close ties requirement. For example, does a convicted Hong 
Kong resident who travels and works in both jurisdictions and who has 
family members living in Macau have the right kind and degree of con-
tact with Macau to satisfy the test? 
As mentioned above, the PTA between Hong Kong and Macau is the 
first regional PTA in “Greater China.”83 Therefore, certain aspects of this 
agreement are likely to be used as a blueprint for a future Hong Kong-
Mainland PTA. The residency status of prisoners eligible for transfer is 
certain to be one of the aspects considered. Although there is no concept 
of permanent resident in the Mainland, according to the Law of the PRC 
on Resident Identity Cards, every citizen who resides in the Mainland 
and is over the age of sixteen should apply for an identity card.84 Ascer-
taining Mainland prisoners’ eligibility for transfer from Hong Kong may 
therefore turn on possession of a PRC identity card, rather than on the 
concept of permanent residency. 
The uncertainties that accompany the close ties test in the Hong Kong-
Macau PTA are likely to be even more problematic in that test’s applica-
tion under a future Hong Kong-Mainland PTA. Compared with Macau 
residents, the number of Mainland residents traveling to Hong Kong has 
been much higher.85 Since the handover, many policies of the govern-
ments of Hong Kong and the Mainland, such as the Mainland’s opening 
of more business sectors to Hong Kong residents and preferential treat-
ment for Hong Kong business in the Mainland under the Closer Eco-
nomic Partnership Arrangement (“CEPA”) on the one hand,86 and Hong 
Kong’s recruitment of elite professionals and laborers from the Mainland 
                                                                                                             
 83. See supra notes 65–70 and accompanying text. The term “Greater China” in-
cludes Mainland PRC, the HKSAR, the Macau SAR, and Taiwan.  
 84. The Law on Resident Identity Cards provides that “[a]ny Chinese citizens who are 
16 years old or older, and who reside within the People’s Republic of China shall apply 
for the identity card; those under 16 years old may apply for it in accordance with the 
present Law.” Law on Resident Identity Cards art. 2, June 28, 2003 (effective Jan. 1, 
2004), translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Feb. 20, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
 85. For example, between 2006 and 2007, while 13,777,735 Mainland residents had 
visited Hong Kong, the number of visitors from Macau was only 594,450. IMMIGRATION 
DEP’T OF THE HKSAR, ANNUAL REPORT 2006–2007 apps., Statistics on Incoming Visitors 
by County/Territory of Residence, available at http://www.immd.gov.hk/a_report_ 
06-07/west/appendices/appendices08.htm. 
 86. For details on the Closer Economic Partnership Arrangement (“CEPA”), see 
Trade and Industry Department of the HKSAR, Mainland and Hong Kong Closer Eco-
nomic Partnership Arrangement (CEPA), http://www.tid.gov.hk/english/cepa/legaltext/ 
cepa_legaltext.html (last visited Apr. 8, 2008). 
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on the other,87 have resulted in a large number of people (primarily the 
working population) with ties to both jurisdictions. Most of these people 
temporarily reside in one jurisdiction for work purposes and ultimately 
spend more time in that jurisdiction than the jurisdiction from which they 
originally came.88 Such ties to the new jurisdiction are sometimes ce-
mented by marriage or purchases of property.89  Under these circum-
stances, how does one determine with which jurisdiction a person has 
closer ties? Apart from these cross-border working populations, the close 
ties test may also cause controversy with respect to Mainland one-way 
permit holders who have just arrived in Hong Kong. Although these one-
way permit holders are new to Hong Kong, because close family ties to 
Hong Kong residents is a condition of the permit, the one-way permit is 
arguably prima facie evidence of close ties with Hong Kong.90 Despite 
having close ties to Hong Kong, however, in practice, given the poor 
prison conditions in the Mainland, residency status eligibility require-
ments may largely be utilized to prevent Mainlanders serving sentences 
in Mainland prisons from taking advantage of a future PTA to request 
transfer to Hong Kong. 
                                                                                                             
 87. Hong Kong implemented the Admission Scheme for Mainland Talents and Pro-
fessionals in 2003, and from 2004 to 2005, 4320 applicants were admitted to work in 
Hong Kong. IMMIGRATION DEP’T OF THE HKSAR, ANNUAL REPORT 2004–2005, at 31 
(2005) (on file with author). 
 88. See, e.g., CENSUS AND STATISTICS DEP’T OF THE HKSAR, GENERAL HOUSEHOLD 
SURVEY: SUMMARY OF SURVEY FINDINGS: HONG KONG RESIDENTS WORKING IN THE 
MAINLAND OF CHINA (2005). According to a survey of the Census and Statistics Depart-
ment of the HKSAR, about 237,500 Hong Kong residents worked in the Mainland in 
2004. Id. 
 89. See Jin nian Gang ren zai neidi zhi ye qingkuang [The Situation of Hong Kong 
Residents Purchasing Property in the Mainland in Recent Years], XINXI SHIBAO 
[INFORMATION TIMES], June 15, 2007, available at http://www.hkcna.hk/doc/2007/2007-
06-15/14978.shtml; Zhang Ming, Gang ren bei shang ying qu zhe zhong; liang di kua 
jing hunyin qunian da 1.1 wan zong [Many Hong Kong Men Head to the Mainland to 
Find a Wife, Cross-Border Marriages Last Year Reached 11,000], ZHONGGUO XINWEN 
WANG [CHINA NEWS NET], Oct. 14, 2004, available at http://www.cns.hk:89/news/2004/ 
2004-10-14/26/494236.shtml. 
 90. According to the immigration policy of Hong Kong, a Mainlander who wants to 
settle in Hong Kong must obtain approval from the relevant Public Security Bureau Of-
fice in the Mainland. XIANGGANG JI BEN FA [BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION] art. 22, translated in http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/ 
fulltext/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2008); Immigration Department of the HKSAR, 
Arrangement for Entry to Hong Kong from Mainland China, http://www.immd. 
gov.hk/ehtml/hkvisas_9.htm (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). The document issued by the 
office approving a Mainlander’s stay in Hong Kong is commonly known as a “One-way 
Permit,” and only children, spouses, elderly relatives, and heirs of Hong Kong residents 
are granted One-way Permits. Immigration Department of the HKSAR, supra. 
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B. Double Criminality 
The Basic Law of the HKSAR guarantees that, except for those laws 
listed in its annex III, national laws of the PRC are not applicable in 
Hong Kong so that Hong Kong is allowed to continue to enforce its own 
bodies of law.91 Because the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of 
China (“Criminal Law”) is not listed in annex III, it cannot be enforced 
in Hong Kong.92 As a result, within the sovereign territory of the PRC, 
Hong Kong and the Mainland have distinct criminal laws. Given the dif-
ferent political, social, and economic conditions in Hong Kong and the 
Mainland, there are some notable differences in the two bodies of crimi-
nal law. Certain acts are crimes only in one jurisdiction and not in the 
other. Due to such differences, the principle of double criminality will 
limit prisoner transfer between Hong Kong and the Mainland. The of-
fense involved in Li Guangqiang’s case illustrates this point. 
On January 28, 2002, Li, a Hong Kong resident, was sentenced to two 
years’ imprisonment and a fine of ¥150,000 by the Fuqing City People’s 
Court in Fuzhou for an “illegal business operation” (engaging in the un-
authorized trading of overseas publications)93 under article 225(1) of the 
Criminal Law.94 The publications involved in this case were 16,280 Bi-
                                                                                                             
 91. XIANGGANG JI BEN FA [BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL ADMINISTRATIVE 
REGION] arts. 8, 18, translated in http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/fulltext/index.htm 
(last visited Apr. 21, 2008). 
 92. H.L. Fu, Comment, The Battle of Criminal Jurisdictions, 28 H.K. L.J. 273, 275 
(1998). 
 93. Hong Kong Businessman Li Guangqiang Obtains Medical Parole, BBC ONLINE, 
Feb. 9, 2002, available at http://www.chinaaffairs.org/gb/detail.asp?id=11623. 
 94. Article 225 of the Criminal Law of the People’s Republic of China (“Criminal 
Law”) provides that: 
Whoever, in violation of state stipulations, has one of the following illegal 
business acts, which disrupts the market order and when the circumstances are 
serious, is to be sentenced to not more five years of fixed-term imprisonment, 
criminal detention, and may in addition or exclusively be sentenced to a fine 
not less than 100 percent and not more than 500 percent of his illegal income 
and, where the circumstances are particularly serious, be sentenced to not less 
than five years of fixed-term imprisonment and a fine not less than 100 percent 
and not more than 500 percent of his illegal income or the confiscation of his 
property: 
(1) engage in the monopoly business or monopolized commodities 
stipulated in laws and administrative regulations, or other commodi-
ties whose purchase and sale are controlled, without permission; 
(2) purchase and sell import-export licenses, certificates of origin, 
and operation permits or approved documents stipulated by other 
laws and administrative regulations; 
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bles, and they were alleged to have been shipped to a Mainland under-
ground Christian sect considered by the Chinese government to be an 
illegal cult.95 
Even if there were a PTA between Hong Kong and the Mainland, 
given the double criminality condition, Li would not have qualified for 
transfer because the act he was imprisoned for (i.e., transporting Bibles) 
is not a crime under the laws of Hong Kong. Similarly, Mainland prison-
ers imprisoned in Hong Kong for offenses like cruelty to non-endangered 
animals (such as dogs and cats)96 or claiming to be triad members,97 
which are not offenses under Chinese criminal law, will not benefit from 
any future prisoner transfer arrangement because there are no analogous 
offenses in the Mainland. Li’s case highlights the fact that in certain cir-
cumstances the application of the double criminality requirement may 
lead to absurd results and injustice.98 
                                                                                                             
(3) conduct other illegal business activities that seriously disrupt the 
market order. 
Criminal Law art. 225, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Apr. 16, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
 95. Hong Kong Businessman Li Guangqiang Obtains Medical Parole, supra note 93. 
Li’s conviction was much more lenient than was expected, for he was originally charged 
with using superstitious societies to undermine the implementation of laws and regula-
tions under article 300(1) of the Criminal Law, a more serious offense punishable by 
more than seven years’ imprisonment. Id. Li returned to Hong Kong on February 9, 2002 
(within two weeks of his conviction) on medical grounds because he was infected with 
hepatitis B. Id. 
 96. Currently, China only has legislation to protect rare and endangered animals, 
namely the Law on the Protection of Wildlife. See Law on the Protection of Wildlife, 
translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited Apr. 16, 2008) (P.R.C.); Guan ai dong wu you 
zhu ti sheng cheng shi wen ming chengdu [Compassion for Animals Helps Promote the 
City’s Level of Culture], NANFANG DUSHI BAO [SOUTH METROPOLITAN DAILY], Jan. 18, 
2008, available at http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/southnews/dd/dsb/sz36/2008011 
80518.asp. In Hong Kong, the maximum penalty for cruelty to animals under the Preven-
tion of Cruelty to Animals Ordinance is a fine of HK$200,000 and imprisonment for 
three years. Prevention of Cruelty to Animals Ordinance, (2006) Cap. 169, § 3, translated 
in http://www.legislation.gov.hk/eng/home.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2008) (H.K.). 
 97. The term “triad societies” refers to crime syndicates, similar to mafia, in Hong 
Kong. Under section 20 of the Societies Ordinance, the maximum penalty for any person 
who claims to be a member of a triad society is HK$100,000 and imprisonment for three 
years in the case of a first conviction for that offense, and HK$250,000 and imprisonment 
for seven years in the case of a second or subsequent conviction for that offense. Socie-
ties Ordinance, (1997) Cap. 151, § 20(2), translated in http://www.legislation.gov.hk/ 
eng/home.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2008) (H.K.). 
 98. A similar argument has been made by Justice J. Dowd of Australia. See KAREN 
SAMPFORD, THE PRISONERS INTERNATIONAL TRANSFER (QUEENSLAND) BILL 1997, LEGIS. 
BULL. NO 11/97, at 12–13 (1997), available at http://www.parliament.qld.gov.au/view/ 
publications/documents/research/legislationBulletins/1997/lb1197ks.pdf. 
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The transfer of political offenders presents an even more controversial 
situation. There is much less tolerance for political speeches and acts in 
the Mainland than in Hong Kong.99 The same acts and speeches that are 
totally lawful when made in Hong Kong might be regarded as criminal in 
the Mainland.100 This poses a dilemma for the authorities in Hong Kong: 
to adopt the double criminality condition would lead to the absurd results 
described above; to forego the condition may give rise to constitutional 
issues when a returned Hong Kong resident is jailed in a Hong Kong 
prison for an act that is not a crime under Hong Kong law. 
C. Finality of Judgment 
Finality of judgment is one of the essential conditions for prisoner 
transfer under both the CTSP and the Model Agreement, but it can also 
provide an excuse to reject a transfer request. The ordeal of two Ameri-
can teenage girls who were imprisoned in Peru is the best illustration of 
the detrimental effect of the requirement.101 
On September 25, 1996, two teenage American girls were arrested for 
drug trafficking in Peru.102 Soon after their arrest, the two girls were de-
tained without charge in a deplorable Peru prison for one and a half 
years.103 Although the PTA between the United States and Peru entered 
into force in 1980,104 the agreement failed to offer any help to the two 
girls at that stage because they had not been sentenced and thus failed to 
satisfy the condition of finality of judgment as provided for in the agree-
                                                                                                             
 99. China’s low tolerance for political speech is clearly reflected in its persistent per-
secution of political dissidents. See, e.g., CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, 109TH CONG., 
ANNUAL REPORT 2006, at 25–42, available at http://www.cecc.gov/pages/annualRpt/ 
annualRpt06/CECCannRpt2006.pdf [hereinafter CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, 
ANNUAL REPORT 2006]. Hong Kong’s law provides for broad freedoms of speech and 
association. See XIANGGANG JI BEN FA [BASIC LAW OF THE HONG KONG SPECIAL 
ADMINISTRATIVE REGION] art. 27, translated in http://www.info.gov.hk/basic_law/ 
fulltext/index.htm (last visited Apr. 21, 2008). 
 100. Because transfer of political offenders between Hong Kong and the Mainland is 
anticipated to be a very complicated and controversial issue, the Author considers that it 
should be discussed in detail in a separate paper. 
 101. For a detailed discussion of this case, see Ralph Ruebner & Lisa Carroll, The 
Finality of Judgment and Sentence Prerequisite in the United States-Peru Bilateral Pris-
oner Transfer Treaty: Calling Congress and the President to Reform and Justifying Ju-
risdiction of the Inter-American Human Rights Commission and Court, 15 AM. U. INT’L 
L. REV. 1071, 1072–78 (2000). 
 102. Id. at 1073. 
 103. Id. at 1074. 
 104. Treaty on the Execution of Penal Sentences, U.S.-Peru, July 6, 1979, 32 U.S.T. 
1471, available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/60001_120000/6/27/00011307.pdf. 
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ment.105 Consequently, no transfer could be arranged. Within a month 
after the girls filed a complaint with the Inter-American Commission on 
Human Rights (“IACHR”), a trial was finally held and the two girls were 
convicted and sentenced.106 The conviction and sentence rendered the 
two girls eligible to apply for a transfer back to the United States to serve 
the remainder of their sentences. Unfortunately, however, the relevant 
judgment was subsequently overruled by the Peruvian Supreme Court 
and the case was remanded for reinvestigation and retrial.107 This turn-
around arose because some Peruvian co-defendants in the case ap-
pealed.108 Peruvian law required the two American girls to join the ap-
peal,109 which caused the original judgment to lose its finality. Failing to 
satisfy the condition of finality, the two girls were again ineligible for 
transfer. They were forced to undergo a retrial, and both were sentenced 
to six years’ imprisonment.110 After serving about two months of their 
sentences in a Peruvian prison, the two girls were released on parole; 
about four months later they finally secured a transfer back to the United 
States to complete their parole.111 By the time they were transferred back 
to the United States, they had been subject to the control of the Peruvian 
criminal justice system for three years and two months.112 
The repeated failure of the U.S.-Peru PTA to address the extended de-
tention of the two American girls in Peru was due to the Peruvian au-
thorities’ non-compliance with the universally recognized human rights 
principle of due process—they failed to charge, try, and sentence the de-
fendants promptly.113 Perversely, however, this deprivation of due proc-
ess also resulted in a failure to satisfy the condition of finality of judg-
                                                                                                             
 105. Ruebner & Carroll, supra note 101, at 1076–77. 
 106. Id. at 1074–75. 
 107. Id. at 1075. 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. 
 110. Id. 
 111. Id. 
 112. See id. at 1073–75. 
 113. For example, paragraph 3 of article 9 of the International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (“ICCPR”) provides that: 
Anyone arrested or detained on a criminal charge shall be brought promptly be-
fore a judge or other officer authorized by law to exercise judicial power and 
shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release. It shall not be the 
general rule that persons awaiting trial shall be detained in custody, but release 
may be subject to guarantees to appear for trial, at any other stage of the judi-
cial proceedings, and, should occasion arise, for execution of the judgment. 
International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights art. 9(3), Dec. 16, 1966, 999 
U.N.T.S. 171. 
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ment. If the finality of judgment condition is included in a future PTA 
between Hong Kong and the Mainland, bearing in mind the deep-rooted 
problem of extended and arbitrary detention in the Mainland, predica-
ments similar to that of the two American girls may arise for Hong Kong 
residents charged with crimes in the Mainland.114 
Although China claims to espouse the principle that the second trial is 
final,115 China’s system of judicial supervision makes this principle illu-
sory in practice. In China, judicial supervision is a procedure that aims to 
uncover and rectify irregularities in the trial process.116 Under this sys-
tem, a judgment that is final in effect may nonetheless be challenged as 
defective.117 This procedure may be invoked by various parties. Parties to 
the case, including the defendant, a near relative of the defendant, the 
prosecution, and the victim (if there is one), may petition the People’s 
Court or the People’s Procuratorate. 118  The president of the court in 
which the judgment was made, higher level People’s Courts, and the Su-
preme People’s Court (“SPC”) may exercise their respective horizontal 
and vertical supervisory functions to challenge a judgment.119 The Su-
preme People’s Procuratorate and higher level People’s Procuratorates 
may also challenge a judgment in accordance with the judicial supervi-
sion system.120 The consequence of an exercise of judicial supervision is 
a retrial of the case concerned.121 
Given that so many parties have the power to request a retrial, judg-
ments of the Chinese courts, even those pronounced by the second in-
stance courts, are subject to challenge and thus not final. The case of Liu 
Yong is one such example. This triad ringleader was sentenced to death 
by an intermediate court, given a suspended death sentence by a higher 
court on appeal, and finally given the death penalty by the SPC in a re-
trial.122 
                                                                                                             
 114. See CONG.-EXEC. COMM’N ON CHINA, ANNUAL REPORT 2006, supra note 99, at 
49–51 (discussing the pattern of extended and arbitrary detention in China). 
 115. See Criminal Procedure Law art. 10, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last visited 
Apr. 16, 2008) (P.R.C.) (“In trying cases, the People’s Courts shall apply the system 
whereby the second instance is final.”). 
 116. For details on judicial supervision, see, for example, CHENG RONGBIN, XING SHI 
SU SONG FA [CRIMINAL PROCEDURE LAW] 361–76 (2000). 
 117. Id. 
 118. See Criminal Procedure Law arts. 203–204, translated in LAWINFOCHINA (last 
visited Apr. 16, 2008) (P.R.C.). 
 119. Id. art. 205. 
 120. Id. 
 121. Id. arts. 204–205. 
 122. For the details of Liu Yong’s case, see Zhongguo Fayuan Wang [China Court 
Net], Criminal Judgment of the Supreme People’s Court on the Retrial of Liu Yong’s 
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The complexity of the finality of judgment requirement also hindered 
the conclusion of an agreement on mutual recognition and enforcement 
of civil and commercial judgments (“Reciprocal Recognition Agree-
ment”) between Hong Kong and the Mainland. 123  Both jurisdictions’ 
experiences resolving the finality of judgment issue in concluding the 
Reciprocal Recognition Agreement provide insight as to how the same 
issue could be resolved for a Hong Kong-Mainland PTA. Under the Re-
ciprocal Recognition Agreement, the uncertain finality of Mainland 
judgments is controlled by two methods. First, recognizing that only cer-
tain courts can make an “enforceable final judgment,” the party who re-
quests enforcement of a Mainland judgment in Hong Kong is required to 
produce a certificate issued by the Mainland court that made the final 
decision certifying that the decision was final.124 Second, if a case is to 
be retried after an application for enforcement of judgment in the same 
case is filed, the retrial should be conducted by the court at the next 
highest level rather than the court that made the judgment in question.125 
D. Minimum Remaining Sentence 
The minimum remaining sentence requirement commonly appears in 
PTAs in one of the following two ways. In the first method, the PTA 
specifies the minimum duration of sentence that must be served in the 
sentencing state before a prisoner is transferred back to the receiving 
state (“the first method”).126 In the second method, the PTA specifies the 
minimum duration of remaining sentence to be served by the prisoner 
                                                                                                             
Case, http://www.chinacourt.org/public/detail.php?id=96393 (last visited Jan. 21, 2008); 
Liu, Yong gai pan si huan neimu diaocha [Investigation into the Inside Story of Liu 
Yong’s Commuted Death Sentence], BEIJING QINGNIAN BAO [BEIJING YOUTH POST], Aug. 
28, 2003, available at http://news.xinhuanet.com/legal/2003-08/28/content_1049028.htm. 
 123. For details on the “finality of judgment” condition in the recently concluded 
Agreement on Reciprocal Recognition and Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and 
Commercial Matters between Hong Kong and the Mainland, see Twin Concessions 
Clinch Judicial Deal, SOUTH CHINA MORNING POST, Apr. 15, 2006; Graeme Johnston, 
China Cross-Border Litigation E-Bulletin, Cross-Border Enforcement of Judgments (July 
17, 2006), http://www.herbertsmith.com/NR/rdonlyres/2D4DE729-E18F-4B48-9CC7-
E18D8A381F78/2316/Chinacrossborderlitigationebulletin170706.htm (last visited Feb. 
20, 2008); Patrick Bourke & Jim James, Law in Business: China: New Deal, 
LEGALWEEK.COM, June 29, 2006 (on file with author). The issue was finally solved and 
an agreement was concluded in July 2006. Arrangement on Reciprocal Recognition and 
Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, P.R.C.-H.K., July 14, 2006, 
translated in http://www.legislation.gov.hk/intracountry/eng/pdf/mainlandrej2006071 
9e.pdf [hereinafter Reciprocal Recognition Agreement]. 
 124. Reciprocal Recognition Agreement, supra note 123, arts. 2, 6. 
 125. Id. art. 2. 
 126. PLACHTA, supra note 3, at 334. 
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concerned at the time of application for transfer (“the second 
method”).127 
The first method has been used rarely, but has been adopted in PTAs to 
which Thailand is a party.128 For example, in the bilateral PTAs Thailand 
has signed with Australia, Canada, Hong Kong, and the United King-
dom, in addition to a one-year minimum remaining sentence requirement 
in accordance with the second method noted above, there is a prohibitive 
clause stating that “an offender may not be transferred unless he has 
served in the transferring State any minimum period of imprisonment, 
confinement or deprivation of liberty stipulated by the law of the trans-
ferring State.”129 According to Michal Plachta, the Thai government’s 
insistence on the inclusion of such a provision is due to “historic sensitiv-
ity regarding interference by foreign courts in Thai judicial decisions.”130 
Similarly, Japan has mandated that a U.S. prisoner must serve at least 
one-third of his sentence in Japan before applying to be transferred back 
to the United States under the CTSP.131 
The second method is the most commonly adopted method for imple-
menting a minimum remaining sentence condition in international prac-
tice, and the minimum sentence duration required is normally six months 
                                                                                                             
 127. Id. 
 128. Id. 
 129. See Agreement on the Transfer of Offenders and on Cooperation in the Enforce-
ment of Penal Sentences art. 3, U.K.-Thail., Jan. 22, 1990, 1656 U.N.T.S. 133; Agree-
ment between the Government of Australia and the Government of the Kingdom of Thai-
land on the Transfer of Offenders and Cooperation in the Enforcement of Penal Sen-
tences art. 3, Aust.-Thail., July 26, 2001, available at http://frli.law.gov.au/s97.vts? 
action=View&VdkVgwKey=2002B00241&Collection=FRLI&ViewTemplate=frliview.h 
ts. The exact wording of the limiting clause in the PTA with Canada differs slightly: “[I]n 
the case of imprisonment, confinement or other form of deprivation of liberty, the of-
fender shall, at the time of transfer, have served in the Transferring State any minimum 
period of the sentence stipulated by the law of the Transferring State.” Treaty on Coop-
eration in the Execution of Penal Sentences art. 2, Can.-Thail., Jan. 5, 1983, 1851 
U.N.T.S. 245, available at http://untreaty.un.org/unts/120001_144071/27/7/0002 
2667.pdf. The language is also slightly different in the PTA with Hong  
Kong. Agreement on the Transfer of Offenders and on Co-operation in the  
Enforcement of Penal Sentences, H.K.-Thail., art. 3, Apr. 25, 2000, translated in 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/table5ti.htm (follow “English(pdf)” hyperlink in “Thai-
land” row) (“an offender may not be transferred unless he has served in the jurisdiction of 
the transferring Party any minimum period of imprisonment, confinement or any other 
form of deprivation of liberty stipulated by the law of the transferring Party”). 
 130. PLACHTA, supra note 3, at 243. 
 131. Embassy of the United States in Japan, U.S. Citizen Services, Prisoner Transfer, 
http://japan.usembassy.gov/e/acs/tacs-transfer.html (last visited Feb. 22, 2008). Japan, 
which ratified the CTSP in February 2003, is one of the non-member states of the Coun-
cil of Europe that has ratified the CTSP. CTSP Status, supra note 29. 
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to one year. Both the CTSP and the Model Agreement set the minimum 
duration of remaining sentence at six months.132 However, insofar as the 
requirement is intended to ensure authorities have adequate time to proc-
ess applications, a six-month minimum remaining sentence requirement 
has already proved to be unrealistic in light of prisoners’ experiences 
with the United Kingdom. As reported by Prisoners Abroad, an interna-
tional prisoner transfer conducted by the United Kingdom normally takes 
twelve to eighteen months to complete,133 but in certain circumstances, it 
may take two years or longer. For example, two prisoners in Spain 
waited for two years before being transferred back to the United King-
dom, and one prisoner from Portugal waited two and a half years for a 
similar transfer.134 Delays in transfer are also common among other sig-
natories of the CTSP,135 and as a survey by the Irish Commission for 
Prisoners Overseas revealed, prisoner transfers in those countries sur-
veyed generally take one year to two and a half years to complete.136 Fac-
tors leading to delays are numerous, including the huge amount of docu-
mentation required, the government bureaucracies involved, certain un-
cooperative interactions between the sentencing state and the receiving 
state, and the inability of the sentencing state and the receiving state to 
agree on how the remaining sentence should be enforced.137 
Unlike the CTSP and the Model Agreement, eight out of nine PTAs 
Hong Kong has signed with other jurisdictions (including the one with 
Thailand) and all three PTAs China has signed stipulate that at the time 
of application, a prisoner should have at least one year of his sentence 
                                                                                                             
 132. CTSP, supra note 25, art. 3(1)(c); Model Agreement, supra note 30, para. 11. 
 133. Prisoners Abroad, Factsheet: Prisoner Transfer to the U.K., http://www. 
prisonersabroad.org.uk/Downloads/Factsheets/Prison_transfer.pdf (last visited Nov. 5, 
2007). 
 134. GINNY GREENLAW & DIANA PARKINSON, BRINGING PRISONERS HOME: 
INTERNATIONAL PRISONER TRANSFER IN THE 21ST CENTURY 45 (2002), available at 
http://www.prisonersabroad.org.uk/Downloads/Research/Bringing_prisoners_home.pdf. 
 135. Eur. Parl. Ass., Operation of the Council of Europe Convention on the Transfer of 
Sentenced Persons—Critical Analysis and Recommendations: Report of the Comm. on 
Legal Affairs and Human Rights, Doc. 9117 (June 1, 2001), available at http://assembly. 
coe.int/main.asp?Link=/documents/workingdocs/doc01/edoc9117.htm [hereinafter Coun-
cil of Europe, Doc. 9117]. The average length of time needed to process a transfer appli-
cation in some CTSP signatory countries are as follows: one year in both the United 
Kingdom and the Netherlands, eighteen months in both Spain and Germany, and two 
years in Ireland. Id. n.13. 
 136. Id. nn.11–13. 
 137. Id. The combined effect of these factors caused one Spanish national with serious 
health problems to wait two years before being transferred from the United Kingdom 
back to Spain. Id. app. I. Although humanitarian grounds (based on the prisoner’s illness) 
could have provided a basis for expedited transfer, no such effort was made. Id. 
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remaining.138 The only exception is the PTA between Hong Kong and 
Macau. In that agreement, the minimum remaining sentence is set at six 
months.139 The Hong Kong government explained that due to the geo-
graphical proximity between Hong Kong and Macau, the procedures for 
handling an application for transfer could be completed within a shorter 
period of time.140 The prisoner transfer arrangement between Hong Kong 
and Macau went into effect on December 1, 2005.141 During the first six 
days of its operation, the Macau prison authority received over fifty 
transfer applications.142 As of June 2006, however, only one Hong Kong 
resident had been successfully transferred from Macau back to Hong 
Kong.143 This suggests that, notwithstanding the geographical proximity, 
setting the remaining sentence at six months is inappropriate, even in the 
context of prisoner transfers between Hong Kong and Macau. Similarly, 
                                                                                                             
 138. Hong Kong’s PTAs with Australia, Italy, the Philippines, Portugal, Sri Lanka, 
Thailand, the United States, and the United Kingdom all include a one year requirement. 
For the text of these treaties, see Department of Justice of the HKSAR, Treaties and In-
ternational Agreements, supra note 65. The PTA with France is the exception; it includes 
a six month remaining sentence requirement. Hong Kong-France PTA, supra note 75, art. 
3(1)(c). The PTA between Hong Kong and the Philippines, in addition to the one-year 
remaining sentence requirement, also limits eligibility to prisoners sentenced to a mini-
mum of three years’ imprisonment. Hong Kong-Philippines PTA, supra note 78, art. 
4(d). With respect to the China PTAs, see P.R.C.-Ukr. PTA, supra note 45, art. 4.1.3; 
P.R.C.-Russ. PTA, supra note 46, art. 5.1.3; P.R.C.-Spain PTA, supra note 46, art. 2.1.1. 
 139. Hong Kong-Macau PTA, supra note 65, art. 4(4)(i). 
 140. LC PAPER NO. CB(2)2018/04-05, supra note 80, at 3. 
 141. 50 Aomen qiu qiu fan Gang fuxing [Fifty Prisoners in Macau Request to Return to 
Hong Kong to Serve Their Sentences], SINGTAO RIBAO [SINGTAO DAILY], Dec. 6, 2005, at 
A18. 
 142. Id. As of March 29, 2006, sixty-nine out of the 107 Hong Kong residents who 
were serving sentences in Macau had applied for transfer. 69 Aomen zai qiu Gang ren 
shenqing fan Gang fuxing [Sixty-nine Hong Kong Prisoners in Macau Have Applied to 
Return to Hong Kong to Serve Their Sentences], DAGONG BAO [DA KUNG PAO NEWS], 
Mar. 30, 2006. 
 143. Liangdi dacheng xieyi shuhuan Aomen jianyu jipo; Aomen shou ming Gang qiu 
ziyuan hui Gang fuxing [Agreement Reached to Alleviate Overcrowding in Macau Pris-
ons; First Hong Kong Prisoner in Macau Was Voluntarily Sent Back to Hong Kong to 
Serve His Sentence], PINGGUO RIBAO [APPLE DAILY], June 8, 2006, at A24. The prisoner 
was a twenty-three-year-old Hong Kong resident who was sentenced to eight and a half 
years’ imprisonment by a Macau court in December 2004 for drug trafficking. Aomen 
shou du yijiao qiufan hui Gang [Macau Transferred Prisoner Back to Hong Kong for the 
First Time], MING BAO [MING PAO DAILY NEWS], June 8, 2006, at A24. The prisoner 
consented to the transfer and the transfer application was approved by the Chief Execu-
tive of Macau on April 9, 2006. Agreement Reached to Alleviate Overcrowding in Macau 
Prisons, supra. The prisoner had already served one and a half years of his sentence in 
Macau when the transfer was completed. Id. He was still required to serve his remaining 
seven years in Hong Kong. Id. 
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geographical proximity failed to facilitate the process of prisoner transfer 
between the United Kingdom and Ireland. In one case, a prisoner was 
transferred back to Ireland from England after forty-two months had 
passed since he had applied for transfer.144 
As discussed above, performing the “close ties” analysis with respect 
to the nationality/residency condition is a potentially complicated and 
time consuming exercise in prisoner transfer between Hong Kong and 
the Mainland. In addition, the different political and legal considerations 
of Hong Kong and the Mainland (as revealed by the numerous political 
and legal controversies between the two jurisdictions since the hand-
over),145 the relative lack of mutual trust between Hong Kong and the 
Mainland,146 and the significant lack of respect for law in the Mainland147 
may further lengthen the transfer process. Therefore, setting the mini-
mum remaining sentence at six months will be equally impracticable in 
the context of prisoner transfers between Hong Kong and the Mainland. 
The fact that the Security Bureau estimates that the procedure to handle a 
prisoner transfer between Hong Kong and the Mainland would take 
about ten months to one year to complete reinforces this argument.148                                                           
                                                                                                             
 144. Council of Europe, Doc. 9117, supra note 135, app. I. 
 145. Two of the most controversial political/legal issues between Hong Kong and the 
Mainland after the handover were the right of abode of children born to Hong Kong resi-
dents in the Mainland and the HKSAR government’s proposed enactment of national 
security legislation to implement article 23 of the Basic Law of the HKSAR. For the de-
tails of these two issues, see, for example, JOHANNES M.M. CHAN, H.L. FU & YASH GHAI, 
HONG KONG’S CONSTITUTIONAL DEBATE: CONFLICT OVER INTERPRETATION (2000); FU 
HUALING, CAROLE J. PETERSEN & SIMON N.M. YOUNG, NATIONAL SECURITY AND 
FUNDAMENTAL FREEDOMS: HONG KONG’S ARTICLE 23 UNDER SCRUTINY (2005). 
 146. The lack of mutual trust between Hong Kong and the Mainland was reflected in 
the controversy over the national security legislation mentioned supra note 145. While 
the HKSAR government emphasized the need to enact the relevant legislation, many 
Hong Kong residents worried that the government would make use of the legislation to 
undermine the rights and freedoms they had enjoyed. FU HUALING, PETERSEN & YOUNG, 
supra note 145. 
 147. China has been severely criticized by the international community for its lack of 
respect for law, and this situation is particularly apparent and acute with respect to human 
rights. See, e.g., U.N. Econ. & Soc. Council [ECOSOC], Comm. on Human Rights, Re-
port of the Special Rapporteur on Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading 
Treatment or Punishment: Mission to China, E/CN.4/2006/6/Add.6 (Mar. 10, 2006) 
(prepared by Manfred Nowak) [hereinafter Mission to China]. 
 148. See Zhong-Gang hu huan qiufan nan shuhuan jianyu ji po [China-Hong Kong 
Prisoner Transfer Unlikely to Alleviate Prison Overcrowding], CHENG BAO [SING PAO 
DAILY NEWS], Nov. 26, 2004, at A8; Yijiao neidi qiufan miandui san nanti [Three Diffi-
culties in Transferring Mainland Prisoners], TAIYANG BAO [THE SUN], Nov. 26, 2004, at 
A8. 
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If a six month requirement is inappropriate, why not adopt the one year 
minimum remaining sentence requirement reflected in the other Hong 
Kong PTAs? Although such a proposal obviates the problem of adminis-
trative delay in application processing, it raises yet another issue: such a 
requirement would substantially reduce the number of prisoners qualified 
to apply for a transfer. According to the Security Bureau, as of Novem-
ber 2005, 48.9% of the Mainlanders serving sentences in Hong Kong had 
a remaining sentence term of less than one year.149 These Mainland pris-
oners would automatically be excluded from a prisoner transfer arrange-
ment if the minimum remaining sentence was set at one year. In fact, 
even the Security Bureau has candidly noted that: “In overall terms, we 
envisage that the long-term effect of the two-way transfer of sentenced 
persons between Hong Kong and the Mainland on our total penal popula-
tion would be insignificant.”150 
While setting the minimum duration of remaining sentence at six 
months or one year would have a substantial impact on the number of 
eligible Mainland prisoners in Hong Kong prisons, the same issue would 
not be as significant for Hong Kong residents serving sentences in 
Mainland prisons. As of November 2005, there were about 600 Hong 
Kong residents serving sentences in Guangdong Province in the 
Mainland.151 Although individual prisoner sentencing data is not avail-
able, the Hong Kong and Mainland news media report that the crimes 
committed by these Hong Kong residents are often serious and punish-
able by a relatively long period of imprisonment.152 This suggests that a 
                                                                                                             
 149. LC PAPER NO. CB(2)755/05-06, supra note 9, at 5. In January 2002, it was even 
reported that ninety percent of the Mainlanders serving sentences in Hong Kong had a 
remaining sentence term of less than one year. LC PAPER NO. CB(2)1023/01-02(03), 
supra note 15, annex A. 
 150. LC PAPER NO. CB(2)1023/01-02(03), supra note 15, annex A. 
 151. LC PAPER NO. CB(2)755/05-06, supra note 9, at 5. 
 152. Between 1998 and 2006, 120 Hong Kong residents received a death sentence or a 
suspended death sentence in the Mainland. Liu Yaoling, Gang ren zai dalu bei pan sixing 
yinqi guanzhu [Hong Kong Residents Sentenced to Death in the Mainland Arouses Con-
cerns], VOICE OF AMERICA NEWS, Mar. 3, 2006, available at http://www.voanews 
.com/chinese/archive/2006-03/w2006-03-03-voa57.cfm. According to the Director of 
Public Prosecutions of Hong Kong, the crimes most frequently committed by Hong Kong 
residents in the Mainland are “financial crimes perpetrated in the guise of legitimate 
businesses, and which often involve an element of corruption.” Press Release, Hong 
Kong Government Information Centre, Speech by Director of Public Prosecutions (Apr. 
30, 2002), available at http://www.info.gov.hk/gia/general/200204/30/0430103.htm. 
Similarly, the Director of the Office of HKSAR Government in Beijing said that “fraud, 
misappropriation of funds and falsely making out invoices for value-added tax” were the 
crimes most frequently committed by Hong Kong people in the Mainland. Gang ren neidi 
qiuzhu zeng yu san cheng [Requests from Hong Kong Residents in the Mainland for As-
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PTA between Hong Kong and the Mainland would likely be more bene-
ficial to Hong Kong residents serving sentences in the Mainland than it 
would be for Mainland residents serving sentences in Hong Kong. 
It is clear that the relevant authorities would not have sufficient time to 
process a transfer application if the minimum remaining sentence re-
quirement is too short. However, the number of eligible prisoners would 
be substantially reduced and the original intent of prisoner transfer would 
be undermined if the minimum remaining sentence requirement is too 
long. How should the authorities in Hong Kong and the Mainland solve 
this problem? 
To give both jurisdictions some flexibility in handling this minimum 
remaining sentence requirement, a Hong Kong-Mainland PTA should 
incorporate a clause that allows the remaining sentence requirement to be 
waived upon mutual consent of both jurisdictions. If both jurisdictions 
agree to a waiver, even if a prisoner’s remaining sentence is less than the 
duration set in the agreement at the time when he applies for a transfer, 
his application may still be processed. In fact, many agreements already 
incorporate such a waiver clause, including the CTSP,153 four of Hong 
Kong’s bilateral PTAs,154 and at least two of China’s PTAs.155 
Undoubtedly, giving the relevant authorities of both jurisdictions the 
discretion to invoke the waiver when in their judgment the special cir-
cumstances of an individual prisoner require it complies with the hu-
manitarian principle behind prisoner transfer. However, given that pris-
oners who benefit from this clause may only need to serve a very short 
sentence remainder in their home jurisdictions after transfer, the extent to 
which the objective of rehabilitation can be achieved is in serious doubt. 
This highlights the importance for the relevant authorities of Hong Kong 
and the Mainland to use restraint in exercising any discretion to waive 
the minimum remaining sentence requirement provided in a future Hong 
                                                                                                             
sistance Increased by Thirty Percent], TAIYANG BAO [THE SUN], Apr. 13, 2005, at A11. 
Moreover, drug offenses, such as drug trafficking and drug manufacturing, are another 
category of offenses commonly committed by Hong Kong residents in the Mainland, and 
these offenses often carry the death penalty. See id; Liu Yaoling, supra. 
 153. CTSP, supra note 25, art. 3(2). 
 154. Hong Kong incorporated waiver clauses in its PTAs with Australia, the United 
Kingdom, the United States, and Macau. Hong Kong-Australia PTA, supra note 78, art. 
4(d)(iii); Hong Kong-United Kingdom PTA, supra note 78, art. 4(d)(iii); Agreement on 
the Transfer of Sentenced Persons, H.K.-U.S., art. 4(2), Apr. 15, 1997, translated in 
http://www.legislation.gov.hk/table5ti.htm (follow “English(pdf)” hyperlink in “United 
States” row); Hong Kong-Macau PTA, supra note 65, art. 4(4)(i). 
 155. P.R.C.-Ukr. PTA, supra note 45, art. 4.2; P.R.C.-Russ. PTA, supra note 46, art. 
5.2. 
2008] PRISONER TRANSFER 491 
Kong-Mainland PTA, so as to ensure the proper balance between human 
rights protection and rehabilitation. 
E. Tripartite Consent 
One practical issue concerning tripartite consent is the willingness of 
Mainland prisoners to be transferred from Hong Kong back to the 
Mainland. China’s prison conditions are notorious.156 Chinese prisons are 
overcrowded,157 as are most prisons in other countries,158 and suffer from 
low hygienic standards.159  In addition, the abuse of power by prison 
guards and the brutality of some inmates (who are often backed by the 
prison guards) are well known.160 Cases of severe injury or death of pris-
oners are reported by the media from time to time.161 China has also been 
denounced by human rights advocates for inhumane prison labor pro-
grams.162 Such poor conditions in Mainland prisons (when compared to 
                                                                                                             
 156. For a detailed description of the prison conditions in the Mainland, see generally 
Mission to China, supra note 147. 
 157. The state of Guangdong’s prisons sheds light on the seriousness of overcrowding 
in Chinese prisons. According to one report in 2003, almost thirty percent of the prisons 
in Guangdong Province were overcrowded. Yue san cheng kanshou suo baoman; yi fan 
zhan; shui sheshi buzu yi sheng oudou [Thirty Percent of the Detention Centers in 
Guangdong Are Overcrowded; Suspects Keep Standing While Sleeping; Insufficient Fa-
cilities Easily Lead to Fighting], MING BAO [MING PAO DAILY NEWS], Nov. 5, 2003, at 
A24. The prison population in the Baoan District Detention Center in Shenzhen was three 
times greater than its available capacity. Id. As a result, seventy to eighty prisoners were 
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stood. Id. 
 158. See Penal Reform International, Prison Overcrowding, http://www.penalreform. 
org/prison-overcrowding.html (last visited Feb. 21, 2008). 
 159. See Philip P. Pan, China’s Prison Laborers Pay Price for Market Reforms, WASH. 
POST, June 14, 2001, at A1. 
 160. See id.; Mission to China, supra note 147, ¶¶ 44–45. 
 161. See, e.g., Sichuan jianyu ye nue qiu: yu jing yong jing gun dianxian huohuo dasi 
qiufan [Sichuan Prison also Mistreats Prisoners: Prison Guard Beats a Prisoner to 
Death with a Baton], SICHUAN XINWEN WANG [SICHUAN NEWS NET], Nov. 4, 2004, avail-
able at http://prison.com.cn/Press/2004-11-4/35F4E62D-2937-4925-A5F9-93AC2362 
A5EF.html; Qin Zuoquan, Fuxing renyuan yu zhong bei da can; huo pei jin 6 wan yuan 
[Inmate Who Becomes Disabled After Being Beaten Is Awarded Nearly 60,000 RMB 
Compensation], FUZHOU RIBAO [FUZHOU DAILY], Aug. 24, 2007, available  
at http://www.chinalawedu.com/news/1000/2/2007/8/li395026349428700220160-0.htm; 
Ren Feilin, Jilin fuxing fan bei jingcha ouda zhi guzhe; jiancha jiguan jie ru diaocha 
[Jilin Inmate Suffered from Bone Fracture After Being Beaten by the Police; Procurator 
Intervenes in the Investigation], ZHONGGUO JILIN WANG [CHINA JILIN NET], Oct. 27, 
2006, available at http://news.1488.com/news/legality/2006/10-27/9-47-42-1.shtml. 
 162. See Pan, supra note 159. 
492 BROOK. J. INT’L L. [Vol. 33:2 
those in Hong Kong prisons) are likely to be a major factor affecting 
whether many Mainland prisoners in Hong Kong prisons even apply for 
a transfer.  
Moreover, many Mainland prisoners may not want their families, 
friends, neighbors, and other fellow citizens to know that they engaged in 
criminal activities in Hong Kong. This is particularly true for Mainland 
women imprisoned for prostitution in Hong Kong. A transfer home un-
der such circumstances not only brings shame on oneself, but also em-
barrasses one’s family. In consideration of both the conditions in 
Mainland prisons and the shame that can accompany a prisoner’s transfer 
back home, a PTA between Hong Kong and the Mainland is unlikely to 
be an attractive mechanism for most, if not all, Mainland prisoners in 
Hong Kong. 
IV. ALTERNATIVES TO TRANSFER ON THE BASIS OF A STANDING PTA 
A. The Need for Alternatives to a Hong Kong-Mainland PTA 
Notwithstanding that the purpose of a PTA is to facilitate prisoner 
transfer, the above discussions reveal that instead of safeguarding the 
interests of foreign prisoners, many conditions in PTAs often present 
obstacles for prisoner transfer. In practice, many prisoner transfer appli-
cations are rejected because of failure to fulfill those conditions, and 
even more are delayed because of the lengthy verification process that 
ensures the conditions are fulfilled.163 
For example, between 1986 and 1990, among the 270 requests for 
transfer to which the United Kingdom was a party (either as a sentencing 
state or a receiving state), only sixty-three (23.3%) were successful.164 
For the other 207 requests, fifty-one (18.9%) were rejected while 156 
were either withdrawn or the prisoners were released before the transfers 
were carried out.165 Similarly, between 1988 and 1990, only 101 (37.5%) 
of the 269 requests for transfer to which the Netherlands was a party 
were successful. 166  Sixty-six (24.5%) were rejected and 102 (37.9%) 
were either withdrawn or the prisoners were released before the transfers 
were carried out.167 
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Hong Kong’s record on prisoner transfer is even bleaker. Between June 
1997 and March 2002, among the eighty-eight prisoner transfer applica-
tions in which Hong Kong was the sentencing state, seventeen (19.3%) 
were rejected because the Hong Kong government was “[u]nable to con-
clude satisfactory ad hoc arrangements or reach consensus on transfer” 
with the receiving state and thirty-three (37.5%) were unsuccessful be-
cause the applications were not processed before the prisoners were dis-
charged.168 Only five (5.7%) applications were successful.169 
The low success rate of international prisoner transfer raises questions 
about the operational effectiveness of a prospective PTA between Hong 
Kong and the Mainland. It is also worth noting that China has included a 
clause in its PTAs with Ukraine and Russia that empowers the signato-
ries to refuse a prisoner transfer even if all other requirements are satis-
fied. The clause states: “Except in the situations stated in the preceding 
paragraph [which includes cases implicating national security, life im-
prisonment, and the death penalty], any party has the autonomy to decide 
on its own whether to consent to a transfer requested by the other 
party.”170 Whether China will insist on adding the same clause to a future 
PTA with Hong Kong is uncertain. The inclusion of such a discretionary 
clause would effectively render all other conditions for transfer meaning-
less, as the ultimate decision will depend on the subjective views of the 
signatories. 
In light of the foregoing, even if Hong Kong and the Mainland success-
fully conclude a PTA according to international practice, it does not nec-
essarily mean that non-resident prisoners serving sentences in either ju-
risdiction will actually benefit from, or voluntarily make use of, such an 
agreement. This calls into question the necessity of a Hong Kong-
Mainland PTA. While negotiations for such an agreement are still un-
derway, and in light of reservations as to the practicability of a Hong 
Kong-Mainland PTA drafted according to international practice, it is 
prudent to consider other methods to facilitate prisoner transfer between 
the two jurisdictions. 
B. Ad Hoc Transfer: Another Form of Prisoner Transfer 
The Hong Kong government has claimed that, at present, prisoner 
transfer between Hong Kong and the Mainland is impossible because of 
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the lack of a PTA between the two jurisdictions. 171 However, the ab-
sence of a PTA does not in fact preclude prisoner transfers. 
Ad hoc prisoner transfer is commonly used in circumstances in which 
there is no standing PTA between the sentencing state and the receiving 
state.172 Due to the lack of an established mechanism in such cases, the 
parties involved must determine eligibility for transfer, the procedure for 
transfer, and the execution of the remaining sentence on a case-by-case 
basis. This ad hoc method of prisoner transfer has already been used by 
both the Hong Kong government and the Chinese government. 
According to information provided by the Security Bureau in March 
2002, Hong Kong had received eighty-eight prisoner transfer applica-
tions since the handover.173 Among these eighty-eight applications, only 
thirty-two involved prisoners from countries that had a PTA with Hong 
Kong at that time.174 Only five out of the eighty-eight applications were 
successful, and of these five prisoner transfers, while four were transfers 
under standing agreement with the United Kingdom, one was an ad hoc 
transfer to Nigeria.175 
The ad hoc transfer to Nigeria aroused some controversy.176 This is be-
cause the prisoner involved in that case was the son of the Consul Gen-
eral of Nigeria in Hong Kong. The twenty-two-year-old man was con-
victed of assaulting police in September 2001 and was sentenced to two 
years’ imprisonment.177 After serving two and a half months of his prison 
term in Hong Kong, he was transferred back to Nigeria to serve his re-
maining sentence.178 The quick transfer aroused suspicions that his father 
had exercised his consular privileges to pressure the Hong Kong gov-
ernment to release him.179 There was also speculation that the so-called 
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“transfer” was actually an early release, because whether he would be 
required to serve his remaining sentence after being transferred back to 
Nigeria was unknown.180 
China signed its first PTA in July 2001, but it had in fact conducted ad 
hoc prisoner transfers with other countries some years before. The first 
prisoner transfer with China was conducted with Ukraine in 1997.181 
Bearing in mind both the humanitarian interests (in allowing foreign 
prisoners to serve their sentences in their home jurisdictions) and in con-
sideration of the administrative inconvenience of incarcerating foreign 
prisoners,182 China transferred, at the request of the Ukraine government 
and with the consent of the prisoners, two Ukrainians sentenced to ten 
years’ imprisonment for theft by a Mainland court in 1994.183 The trans-
fer was initiated by the Embassy of Ukraine, which issued an express 
request to the Chinese government.184 The two prisoners were transferred 
to the custody of the relevant Ukraine officials at Beijing Capital Airport 
and sent home by plane.185 The transfer process took about six months to 
complete.186 
China’s most recent prisoner transfer took place on February 22, 2004 
when the Ministry of Justice in China transferred a Cameroonian pris-
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oner to the Cameroonian government at Beijing Capital Airport.187 The 
prisoner had been sentenced to twelve years’ imprisonment for theft in 
1999 and was serving his sentence in the Qingdao Prison in Shandong 
Province.188 This transfer, which took about eight months to complete 
starting in June 2003, was made at the request of the Cameroonian gov-
ernment because of the health problems of the prisoner concerned.189 
While ad hoc transfer may be an alternative to transfers under a stand-
ing agreement, based on the outcomes of the eighty-eight applications 
handled by Hong Kong between the handover and March 2002, it is clear 
that the likelihood of success is even less than transfer based on a stand-
ing agreement. This is a natural consequence because ad hoc transfers 
require the negotiation of a new arrangement for every application. 
Given the different political, legal, and other considerations in each case, 
negotiating the conditions for transfer, the procedure for transfer, and the 
method of enforcement for the remaining sentence between the two ju-
risdictions is certain to be tedious. The lengthy negotiations may render 
an application unsuccessful, as the parties may not be able to reach an 
agreement before the prisoner concerned is discharged, or they may be 
unable to reach an agreement at all. 
Although there are many uncertainties when a transfer is conducted on 
the basis of a standing agreement, a PTA at least ensures both parties 
have negotiated the principal issues, have some understanding of each 
other’s concerns, and have reached agreement on certain issues. From 
this point of view, prisoners’ rights are likely to be better protected if 
there is a PTA. As Michal Plachta remarks: 
While it would seem a sensible precaution to make provisions in the 
domestic legislation for ad hoc agreements, they should be regarded as 
a second-best when compared with regular treaties. Provided that there 
is some expectation that regular use will be made of it, a treaty is much 
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the more economical approach; it gives certainty and stability to both 
(or all) parties; and it settles the question of reciprocity.190 
However, because both Hong Kong and the Mainland have experience 
with ad hoc prisoner transfers and the two parties have not yet concluded 
a PTA (and in fact, it is uncertain when or if an agreement could be con-
cluded), Hong Kong and the Mainland should accommodate the needs of 
prisoners requesting transfers home to serve their sentences by using an 
ad hoc transfer system. Nevertheless, given the relatively large number 
of potential applications (when compared to the applications from pris-
oners who are residents of jurisdictions other than the Mainland), ad hoc 
transfer from Hong Kong prisons may only be a short term solution. In 
the long term, a PTA between Hong Kong and the Mainland may well be 
indispensable because it will save time and resources and provide pre-
dictability. 
C. Immediate Repatriation/Deportation After Sentencing: Another Op-
tion for the Sentencing State? 
Given that the proportion of Mainland prisoners in Hong Kong who 
have a remaining sentence term of less than one year has been close to 
fifty percent,191 a PTA, regardless of whether the minimum remaining 
sentence requirement is set at six months or one year, is unlikely to bene-
fit this group of prisoners (especially from the rehabilitative perspective). 
Because a majority of these Mainland prisoners were imprisoned for 
immigration offenses (mainly illegal entry, breach of conditions of stay, 
and entering Hong Kong with forged travel documents),192 repatriation, 
which does not require the consent of the prisoner, is likely to be a more 
effective method to transfer them back to the Mainland. 
Under the current immigration policy of Hong Kong, once a Mainland 
illegal immigrant is arrested by the police, depending on the duration of 
his illegal stay in Hong Kong, the Immigration Department may employ 
one of two possible procedures. Under the first option, an illegal immi-
grant who has been in Hong Kong for less than two months will be inter-
rogated shortly after his arrest to determine whether his entry into Hong 
Kong was illegal and, if so, whether he should be allowed to remain in 
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Hong Kong on humanitarian grounds.193 After making these determina-
tions, if the Immigration Department decides to remove him, a “Refusal 
Notice” will be issued against him, and he will be detained until repatria-
tion.194 The repatriation is normally carried out within one week.195 Un-
der the second option, an illegal immigrant who, at the time he is ar-
rested, has been in Hong Kong for more than two months will be placed 
in detention shortly after his arrest.196 A “Notice of Removal Order” will 
be issued against him either before or after his detention.197 If the de-
tained immigrant intends to challenge the removal order, he has to give 
written notice to the Immigration Department within twenty-four hours 
of his receipt of the Notice of Removal Order; if he accepts the removal 
order, he will be repatriated.198 
The two aforementioned repatriation methods only apply to Mainland-
ers who have illegally entered (or stayed in) Hong Kong and have com-
mitted no other offense.199 Mainlanders who have committed any other 
offense (other than illegal entry or stay), regardless of whether they also 
entered or stayed in Hong Kong illegally, must go through the formal 
judicial process in Hong Kong courts. Given the lack of any prisoner 
transfer arrangement between Hong Kong and the Mainland, normally 
these Mainland offenders would have to complete their sentences before 
being sent home. However, in certain circumstances the Chief Executive 
of the HKSAR does have the power to deport a non-Hong Kong prisoner 
after sentencing.200 
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While deportation of foreign criminals is an administrative measure in 
Hong Kong, it may constitute criminal punishment in the Mainland. Ar-
ticle 35 of the Criminal Law provides that “Deportation may be applied 
in an independent or supplementary manner to a foreigner who commits 
a crime.”201 The Chinese government commonly subjects foreigners who 
committed crimes in the Mainland to deportation.202 
The term “deportation” (quzhu chujing) in Chinese refers to expelling 
someone from the territory of a country.203 The term “territory” under the 
Criminal Law should be read as jurisdictional territory, not the sovereign 
territory of the PRC, because the Criminal Law is not applicable to the 
HKSAR204 by virtue of the principle of One Country, Two Systems.205 
Also, because Hong Kong residents are “foreigners” with regard to the 
jurisdictional territory of the Mainland, the term “foreigner” under article 
35 of the Criminal Law should include Hong Kong residents.206 Thus, it 
naturally follows that a Hong Kong resident may be expelled by the 
Mainland authorities from the jurisdictional territory of the Mainland to 
the jurisdictional territory of Hong Kong. In other words, the criminal 
punishment of deportation under article 35 of the Criminal Law may be 
applied to Hong Kong residents.207 
Thus, repatriation/deportation of prisoners in Hong Kong and the 
Mainland is possible under the laws of both jurisdictions and it is likely 
to be a more effective and expedient method for Hong Kong to transfer 
many Mainland prisoners back to the Mainland. The only problem with 
this method is that it fails to serve the deterrent purpose of punishment 
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because the repatriated/deported criminal would be sent back to his home 
country soon after sentencing, and there is no guarantee that any (admin-
istrative or criminal) punishment would be imposed by his home jurisdic-
tion after his return. 
Because the rehabilitation and deterrent purposes are unlikely to be 
achieved (especially without the cooperation of the receiving state) when 
a prisoner is repatriated or deported immediately after sentencing, this 
transfer method is unsuitable for most prisoners. However, from the per-
spective of criminal justice policy, such measures may be justified in 
cases in which Mainlanders have been convicted for the crimes of prosti-
tution or working without permission in Hong Kong. Both of these of-
fenses are really victimless crimes; however, they may result in a  
maximum punishment of three years’ imprisonment.208 Mere repatria-
tion/deportation may be sufficient punishment. Moreover, imprisonment 
has already proved to be an ineffective deterrent (especially for those 
who come to Hong Kong for prostitution)—many come back to Hong 
Kong and commit the same crime again. The Hong Kong Police have 
acknowledged that some Mainland prostitutes they arrest have been ar-
rested in and repatriated from Hong Kong many times.209 
CONCLUSION 
This Article has demonstrated that concluding a PTA between Hong 
Kong and the Mainland that is practical in the context of prisoner transfer 
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between the two jurisdictions is not an easy task. It is anticipated that the 
relevant authorities of the two jurisdictions will encounter many prob-
lems in concluding a Hong Kong-Mainland PTA and implementing such 
an agreement in the future, even if the internationally recognized pris-
oner transfer conditions are adopted. The negotiation process is therefore 
bound to be tedious. 
Prisoners serving sentences in foreign jurisdictions should not be de-
prived of the right to transfer to their home jurisdictions simply because 
of the lack of a standing PTA. While negotiations are still underway be-
tween Hong Kong and the Mainland, alternative methods of prisoner 
transfer should be employed. Ad hoc transfer, a method that has been 
utilized by Hong Kong and the Mainland in facilitating prisoner transfers 
with other countries, is a viable solution for the short term. Even if a 
Hong Kong-Mainland PTA is concluded, ad hoc transfer should be a 
fallback method to conduct prisoner transfer on humanitarian grounds in 
cases where the normal conditions of prisoner transfer are not satisfied. 
Repatriation and deportation should also be considered as more practi-
cal methods for Hong Kong to transfer the large number of Mainland 
prisoners with short sentence terms (particularly those imprisoned for 
immigration offenses and engaging in prostitution) back to the Mainland. 
This does not mean a PTA between Hong Kong and the Mainland is un-
necessary. Rather, a Hong Kong-Mainland PTA remains important for 
Mainland prisoners in Hong Kong who have longer sentence terms and 
for Hong Kong residents who are serving sentences in Mainland prisons. 
